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CIVIL SOCIETY AND MULTIPLE REPOSITORIES OF POWER
ABNER S. GREENE*
INTRODUCrION
The primary goal of civil society revivalists is not the revival of
civil society. It is the empowerment of otherwise alienated citizens.
Reviving civil society is seen as the principal means to that end, but it
is not the only means. To be sure, the revivalists focus their attention
on participation in nongovernmental associations. But the ways of
overcoming alienation are plural, and they include participation in
government, participation in nongovernmental associations, and
assertions of individual rights against various forms of collective will.
In this brief essay, I first explain why only a pluralist
understanding of human flourishing fits with our constitutional
structure. I challenge Mark Tushnet's assertion that a paradox
underlies the calls for revival of civil society. Next, I contend that the
classic public/private line serves important pluralist ends, helping to
ensure a variety of forms of collective action. Third, I take up the
claim raised by Linda McClain and Jim Fleming that civil society is
valuable only (or primarily) insofar as it fosters civic virtue. At least
for adults, this is wrong. Ensuring pluralism for children, however,
raises a particularly difficult problem, and in the last section I respond
to a challenge raised elsewhere by Steve Gilles, who argues for a
strong version of parental liberty to educate children as they see fit.
Although Gilles' framework makes sense in thinking about the liberty
of adults, it fails properly to account for the overarching principle of
multiple repositories of power when dealing with the education of
children.
I. EMBEDDED LIvES: PLURAL WAYS OF FLOURISHING
Think about your everyday life. You pay taxes, cannot park in
what looks like an empty space because it is too close to the fire
hydrant, and get delayed on the subway for unknown reasons. You
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., University of Michigan, 1986;
B.A., Yale University, 1982.
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also get teased by friends for your mood at the local bar, play in your
weekly softball game even when you are tired, and get up earlier than
you would like in order to get your kids to school. Or consider the
flip-side: You are happy that your best way to work is on a newly
paved road, crime has gone down in your neighborhood, and your
son's new public school first-grade teacher has him excited about
learning. In addition, your private sector job is rewarding, you enjoy
your weekly "date" with your spouse to your favorite local bistro, and
your new house in the country is coming along fine. Your life-its
downs and its ups-is lived in a seamless web of public and private,
and you do not spend much time distinguishing public from private
pressures or public from private joys. They are all just there,
intertwined.
Our lives-our real lives, not the lives of the citizens or persons
we often read about in the legal literature-are embedded in a thick
public/private mix of influence. Calls for revival of civil society must,
therefore, be understood (if not to be turned into straw arguments) as
made with the appreciation that we do not one morning just wake up
and divorce ourselves from public institutions while running to a
peaceful nonalienated land of private associations. Nor should we
understand the revivalists to be making the claim that civil society
institutions "allow us to generate and maintain values independent of
the state's influence."' Mark Tushnet says revivalists are making just
such a claim. He says that "the paradox... is obvious: How can civil
society's institutions constrain and be a source of appropriate
influence on the very government that defines the boundaries within
which they may operate, and that assists them with institutional
guarantees? ' 2
But to argue for the exogeneity of civil society-for its existence
separate and apart from the state-would be to make an error of
description. Civil society institutions may be "private" but they of
course are shaped in part by law. Public institutions, in turn, are
shaped in part by private mores. The argument for the checking
function of civil society institutions -that they can provide a source of
power to challenge and offset government-need not depend on the
strict independence of those institutions. They can serve as one
among many avenues for human flourishing. Even if they are
1. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 380 (2000).
At least this is not the way for revivalists to put their best foot forward.
2- Id. at 6.
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endogenous to a broad public-private framework.
The best argument for the revivalists, thus, is not that civil
society institutions check the public sector in a way unconstrained by
that public sector. Rather, the revivalists should be understood as
arguing for a plural form of human flourishing that encompasses
participation in civil society institutions, as well as action through
governmental or individual forms. This pluralism exists even if we
understand these forms of flourishing to be interdependent. And it is
linked to the central defining norm of American constitutionalism:
multiple repositories of power. Our constitutional culture is built on
a shifting foundation, and multiple repositories of power are at the
base.3
The refusal to privilege any locus of power, public or private,
may be seen in many ways. First, there are the standard divisions of
public power: the commitment to dividing power vertically, between
nation and states; the parallel commitment to horizontal division of
power, among the legislature, executive, and courts; and the role of
courts in checking the two political branches. Next, there is the
textual locus of many of those checks, the Bill of Rights, many of
which help assure the ability of citizens to challenge governing norms.
Finally, there is the clearest public/private line: the Constitution's
facial application to government institutions, and its failure to touch
private ones.
The result of this careful fracturing of authority is profound. We
have no king, no ministry of culture dictating proper English, no
prime minister acting in Parliament, no centrally organized church, no
power in the courts to block the publication of scandalous
newspapers. We have, instead, an irreducible Constitution, one that
animates a constant struggle for authority, power, and privilege.
Each of the following three sections-on the public/private line, on
3. See generally Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND
RELIGION: A CRmIcAL ANTHOLOGY (S. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 123 (1994); Abner S. Greene,
Government of the Good, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion
Special?: A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535; Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel
and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Greene, Kiryas
Joel]; Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293 (1996)
[hereinafter Greene, Irreducible Constitution]; Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the
Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review
of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 646 (1994) (book review); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and
Why They're Not, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999) (part of the
Symposium on Law and Religion) [hereinafter Greene, Vouchers].
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the acceptance of significant freedom for adults to create their own
normative communities, and on the need to ensure a public sector
role in the education of children-is a way of fleshing out our deep
commitment to fractured power.
II. DEFENDING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE LINE
My central claim in this section is that three common
distinctions -law versus other constraints, constitutional law versus
other law, public law versus private law-serve functions that track
our Constitution's core commitment to multiple repositories of
power. This requires that both power and its challengers be fractured
and relegated to differential modes of collective action. I will offer
three arguments. First, all three lines serve a division of labor
function; they allow specialization and the development of a certain
type of comparative advantage. Second, and more importantly, all
three lines promote multiple types of collective action to challenge
governing norms. We challenge law through various vehicles,
including constitutional amendments, judicial interpretation
(controversially), statutory enactments, amendment and repeal, and
common law gradualism. We challenge nonlegal norms, such as those
of morality and etiquette, through quite different methods. In
parallel fashion, the line between what is and is not governed by the
Constitution instantiates differential modes of collective action:
amendments (and perhaps judicial ruling) for constitutional change
and lobbying to gain statutory and regulatory change. Likewise,
convincing a legislature or agency to add, amend, or repeal a statute
or regulation requires a different type of collective effort than
convincing a common law judge to develop principles of common law.
Third, all three lines acknowledge our doubts about the legitimation
of authority. In establishing different methods for challenging
authority, these lines recognize different theories of legitimacy.
When the critical theorist suggests that any of these three lines
are fragile, she is certainly correct but, in my view, she is missing the
point. I agree that we must study nonlegal norms, seek to apply
constitution-like rules to private actors, and persuade common law
judges to be less reactionary4 The question is not whether collective
4. For example, my defense of the public/private distinction is not meant to secure a
private realm of family life toward which the state has no appropriate regulatory role. My
concern is to always keep front and center the varieties of methods of achieving social change-
to avoid privileging the centralizing mode over less-centralizing contenders.
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action is important on both sides of these lines, but rather whether
the same type of action should promote change on both sides. There
are substantial reasons embedded in our constitutional structure to
avoid reducing all sources of constraint to a ground norm,
challengeable through a common method. Both negative and positive
arguments exist for this conclusion. We should doubt whether any
particular method of collective action is best; each method has
distinct virtues.5
A. Division of Labor
First, and most obviously, our core commitment to multiple
repositories of power both relies on and instantiates a healthy division
of labor. Rather than expecting a legislator to be an executive, a
constitutional norm-maker to be a private lawmaker or a social
anthropologist to be a lawyer, the fracturing of authority allows
various shops to be set up. Comparative advantages can be
developed. Specifically, expertise can be developed efficiently,
without the need to become a master of social change in all of its
guises.
B. The Diversity of Modes of Collective Action
The critical push toward collapsing the public/private distinction
threatens the diversity of modes of collective action. Assume the
schools in my neighborhood are awful, underfunded, crime-ridden
and delivering poor education. How should I and my neighbors seek
to change this utilizing the three instances of the public/private
distinction? To begin with, we can use nongovernmental, private
community methods of action (as opposed to invoking rules of
positive law). We can seek legislation (as opposed to invoking
constitutional norms). We can seek to persuade a state judge to
construe our state's common law as mandating an equal education for
all (as opposed to invoking constitutional norms or seeking
legislation). I am not now concerned with which of these methods
5. My argument has great affinity to Mike Seidman's argument in Louis Michael Seidman,
Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of
Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987). Where Seidman focuses on the need to have
robust public and private realms in which different values can be advanced, I focus on the need
to maintain diverse modes of collective action to advance such values. We share a sense of the
importance of keeping the boundary between the public and the private fluid, subject to
creation and recreation in the cauldron of politics. See Greene, Irreducible Constitution, supra
note 3, at 299, 301.
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will be most productive or which should be available. The example is
meant to illustrate the various modes of collective action that are
ordinarily available (although not always, in the end, applicable).
Looking first at the public/private distinction as seen through the
governmental/nongovernmental line. Assume there is a private
association that discriminates against racial minorities. How might
this be stopped? We might try to act without the aid of government.
Various forms of private pressure might be brought to bear, including
picketing, meetings with association leaders, boycotts of association
members' businesses, and meetings among those challenging the
association. These forms of collective action are nongovernmental,
but they are the essence of politics. They help to bring together
previously disparate folk; the common enemy, the association, helps
to create a community-in-opposition that it wishes would just go
away.6
What would happen if the disaffected abjured these methods of
action, and instead went directly to court, for a constitutional or
common law ruling, or to the legislature, for statutory action? Many
of the virtues of the private forms of collective action would
disappear. I am talking now not only about the possibly greater
effectiveness of private action, but also of what one might call the
ancillary effects of such action. Namely, the bonding among the
challengers and the increased confidence in their ability to affect the
conditions of their lives.
Next consider the public/private distinction at the governmental
level, where constitutional norms are set against statutory ones. Why
should we refuse to apply constitutional anti-discrimination norms
directly to private exclusionary associations? I do not doubt for a
minute that many such associations affect the lives of the excluded in
substantial ways. My local public school might refuse to admit black
children; my local little league might do the same. Both will have
6. There is, of course, great instability in the definitional distinction between public and
private here. Both governmental and nongovernmental power sources use sanctions and forms
of coercion. Perhaps initial consent in joining can identify the nongovernmental associational
realm, but that condition also seems inexact, given both the possibility of exit from a
governmental jurisdiction and the lack of truly volitional consent in joining many
nongovernmental groups. On involuntary membership as the touchstone of "government"
versus "nongovernment," see Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1519, 1523 (1982). Additionally, I do not suggest that life apart from government is
somehow natural or prepolitical. See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor
Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1417 (1982). Even given an unstable borderline between the
public and the private, and even given the infusion of politics in both forms, my concern is to
recognize the value of the various methods of politics, of collective action.
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disastrous results for the black kids, not to mention the white ones. If
we aggregate private opportunities for discrimination, it becomes
clear that private power centers can be every bit as dangerous as
public ones. So why not apply constitutional norms to the private
centers? Underlying the textual answer (the Constitution in most
places constrains governmental actors only) is an answer sounding in
multiple repositories of power. Just as government itself must be
fractured at its core, so must the ways to challenge power, public and
private, be divided rather than united.
By refusing to apply the Equal Protection Clause to the racially
discriminatory private association, and by refusing to apply the Free
Speech Clause to the corporation that forces its employees to toe the
company line, we accomplish two important goals. First, we allow
ourselves to remain unsure of the correctness of any particular form
of collective action. I will say more about this in the next section; the
main point is that a certain agnosticism about virtue is not only
healthy, but also fitting with the broad anti-foundationalism of our
constitutional culture.
Second, and the focus of this section, we encourage a diversity of
modes of collective action. You cannot just walk into a federal court
and get an injunction against the private discriminator or speech-
suppressor. You must proceed in other ways. The discussion of the
first instantiation of the public/private distinction just above-the
governmental/nongovernmental line-suggests that you can gather up
like-minded dissenters and find various ways of applying pressure.
This is a kind of grass-roots political empowering that does not exist
with lawsuits. The next instantiation, constitutional/nonconstitu-
tional, suggests the use of legislative modes of change. Just as private
pressure can lead both to more finely reticulated responses from the
oppressors and more genuine bonding among the oppressed, so can
legislative lobbying produce results different from those engendered
by constitutional agitation.
The third instantiation of the public private line is the so-called
public law/private law distinction. Here, I will focus on the
institutional issue: the common law as made by judges versus
statutory/regulatory law made elsewhere.7  Remember that the
pressure toward collapsing the public/private distinction comes from
7. In source of law terms, law is "private" if made by nongovernmental actors and merely
enforced by the courts. The common law has been (in its less ambitious guise) the method for
private law to manifest itself in a governmental pronouncement.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the public side, wanting to diminish the private.8 So, one might argue
that advances in, say tort law, should be made legislatively rather than
judicially. The legislature is more accountable than the judiciary.9
The legislature has fact-finding capabilities the judiciary lacks.
Legislation applies prospectively, which has its own virtues. So why
allow tort law to be made by judges?
There are two answers, depending on one's view of the common
law. If we want the common law to be the "common" law, moving
incrementally and capturing common understandings through the
law, then the virtue of so-called private law is its mirroring of
nongovernmental modes, yet capturing them in a governmental form,
thereby allowing governmental sanctions. If we want the common
law to be something grander (think of California's development of
product liability), then the virtue of so-called private law is in its
elegant (mischievous?) combination of policymaking without
accountability. A republican form of government may be bequeathed
to us in Article IV, Section 4, but nonrepublican forms of action can
be salutary, ushering in important legal/social change that otherwise
would not occur; either because of too-high collective action costs in
the purely private realm (too hard to fight Coca-Cola's exploding
bottles through citizen boycotts) or too-high lobbying blockades in
the legislative realm.
The criticism of the three instantiations of the public/private line
decries the smallness of the private and champions the tremendous
ability of the public to get things done; to sweep away power centers
that have privileged the haves and stomped on the have-nots. My
main point in this section has been to defend a diversity of forms of
collective action, which I believe the public/private line results from
and helps to foster.
C. Uncertainty and Legitimacy: A Different Type of Diversity
In the previous section, I said that maintaining the public/private
distinction in each of its instantiations allows us to remain unsure of
the correctness of any particular form of collective action, and that a
certain agnosticism about virtue is not only healthy, but also fitting
8. There is, of course, enormous pressure to collapse the public into the private, as well.
But libertarian critiques of government, although sharing a desire to dissolve the public/private
line, raise a host of different problems. I won't deal with them here.
9. Clearly more so than an unelected judiciary; probably more so than an elected
judiciary, too, because each legislator will represent fewer people than a judge and will hold
herself out as a constituent server.
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with the broad anti-foundationalism of our constitutional culture.
This section is a point about both uncertainty and legitimacy.
With respect to uncertainty, there are times when we are
convinced that law is needed over extralegal norms, or constitutional
law over other law, or public law over private. At many other times
we may be only marginally persuaded of the need for one form of
collective action over another. In constitutional law there are famous
(and unending) debates about whether a constitutional versus
statutory mode is the best way to go in certain instances (e.g., the
criticism of Roe v. Wade10 on the ground that state statutory action
was solving the problem and leading to greater political
empowerment).11 Relishing the diversity of modes of collective action
helps guard against the hubris of certainty, thus acknowledging and
bringing to light a deeper uncertainty of the chosen means of
achieving social change. That uncertainty leads to a greater
willingness to consider other options for change, to question one's
chosen method.
In regards to legitimacy, classic doubts about the legitimacy of
governmental action persist on both the left and the right. The right
tends to argue along lines of non-consent-both systemically and
issue by issue, government acts on all with the actual consent of only
some. More generally, the challenge from the right seeks to limit
government on the ground that even if a more systemic notion of
consent is available, because such a notion will necessarily depend on
certain fictions, the resulting governmental power should be made
small. The left has a different concern. The concern here is about the
cooptation of government by sources of concentrated power, and the
deliberate and indifferent ignoring of the needs of those that are
worse off.
Both right and left are expressing concerns about governmental
legitimacy. Maintaining a robust public/private line can help assuage
such concerns by leaving in place various methods of challenging
power. Each method may have its own legitimacy problems, to be
sure, but because no method gains monopoly status, the legitimacy
problems are traded off against each other and thereby minimized. In
the first instantiation of the public/private distinction, we can engage
in extralegal forms of collective action not just because of their
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 175 (1991).
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empowering virtues, but also because of their more direct claim to
legitimacy. The banding together of like-minded people to force
change from a local institution of power skirts the legitimacy problem
of getting the government to force such change. When the local
power institution yields to the community demands, we can see this as
analogous to private contracting, to "true" consent by both sides.
Such consent is absent if the city council pushes similar change
through legislation. Extralegal forms of collective action have their
own legitimacy problems, though. Heavy forms of coercion from
parochial interests may force decisions in the interest of the few
rather than the many, whereas governmental action would filter the
parochial interests, leading to legislation (or other forms of
governmental action) more truly representative of the population.
In the second instantiation of the public/private line, the
legitimacy problems of constitutional change are widely understood.
To the extent that constitutional change takes place through judicial
decision (I bracket whether such is the case), much has been written
about the legitimacy problems regarding the power of nine unelected
judges. Statutory, regulatory, and common law change are all
trumpeted as more legitimate.
Constitutional amendment is also thought, by some, to have
greater legitimacy than judicial "interpretation." But constitutional
amendment carries its own legitimacy problems. The difficulty of the
amendment process is based on what many deem fundamental
illegitimacy in the document -equal representation in the Senate plus
a supermajority requirement. The Senate problem is thought to
violate a cardinal principle of equality. The supermajority
requirement (although lauded by many) is problematic both on its
own (denying the voice of the majority in some instances) and when
combined with the Senate problem (allowing a few underpopulated
states to have a vastly disproportionate impact on amending). But
just when it seems that nonconstitutional methods of governmental
change are superior, good arguments come along for the greater
legitimacy of higher lawmaking of constitutional change in whatever
guise (amendment, judicial interpretation, or constructive
amendment by the people). Lower lawmaking, the quotidian stuff of
politics, carries its own brand of illegitimacy, including capture by
powerful private groups.
Such concerns with constitutional and statutory change arise in
the third instantiation of the public/private line. Public law is either
too unaccountable (in its constitutional forms) or too accountable (in
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its lower track forms). Private law, some argue, is more truly
representative and efficient than public law. Thus, it is more
legitimate. It is a close cousin of extralegal forms of collective action,
in some cases simply opening the courts to enforcement of such
private deals. But private law is not free from legitimacy problems,
which include some of the problems of extralegal action and some of
statutory action-a certain parochialism, denial of the common good,
and shift of power from one monopoly source to another.
Forcing social change will always raise legitimacy questions.
Maintaining a diversity of modes of collective action helps to
minimize the challenge from any given front and, in a way, aids in
legitimating the entire package of collective action on all fronts
combined.
III. Is CIVIL SOCIETY DEFENSIBLE ONLY IF IT FOSTERS CIVIC
VIRTUE?
My principal difference with the paper offered by this
symposium's co-organizers, Linda McClain and Jim Fleming, 12 is that
it continually critiques civil society institutions for not carefully
enough inculcating democratic virtues, virtues of citizenship. This
critique is misplaced, for one of the hallmarks of civil society
institutions is their centrifugal rather than centripetal force. That is,
many nongovernmental associations offer values that are more
separatist and insular than they are inclusive and heteronomous.
That our constitutional order both permits government to foster the
the collective through government speech rather than coercion, while
simultaneously allowing private, nomic communities to develop quite
different modes of living, is a strength rather than a weakness. It is
wrong to chastise civil society institutions for not being enough like
public institutions.
McClain and Fleming sound the call throughout their paper for
civil society that mirrors or buttresses public citizenship. They do this
first by characterizing the revivalists as calling for civil society to"prepar[e] children to be good citizens" and for the family to be the
first and most important school for citizenship.13 Having set up the
revivalists this way, they then ask, "how does 'table talk'... shape
12. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 301 (2000).
13. Id. at 310.
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family members for democratic self-government?' 1 4 They add, "there
is nothing about families and their moral discourse that insures that
they will be seedbeds of virtue rather than seedbeds of vices such as
parochialism, prejudice, and intolerance.' 1 5 The revivalists also,
according to McClain and Fleming, "claim that participation in
voluntary associations within civil society fosters the arts and habits of
self-government.' 6  But how do these institutions "develop a
commitment to shared values?"' 17 They do acknowledge that civil
society "is at least as important for securing deliberative autonomy-
enabling people to decide how to live their own lives - as for
promoting deliberative democracy-preparing them for participation
in political life."' 8 But this concession does not lead McClain and
Fleming to analyzing the virtues of a private associational realm that
offers, perhaps, homogeneity rather than heteronomy. Instead, they
suggest two ways in which civil society and democratic self-
government may be linked. First, civil society associations may serve
as "counterpublics"'19 to the state. But McClain and Fleming's
description of these counterpublics suggests virtue only insofar as
they mimic democratic values. Second, civil society associations may
serve as locations for democratic deliberation. Again, the virtues of
civil society are seen through the prism of civic virtue only.
The argument that civil society should be judged by how
successfully it replicates the virtues of a democratic public realm is
clearest when McClain and Fleming discuss public reason. Public
reason requires that fundamental political decisions are made on the
basis of a common ground, rather than on a particular comprehensive
view of the good. "The disposition to honor the moral duty of
civility," argue McClain and Fleming, "including the constraints of
public reason, is a crucial component of civic virtue properly
conceived .... Citizens who reject this duty of civility are thus lacking
in civic virtue .... For they put their zealous quest for the good as
they see it above pursuing the common good and common
ground... ."20 And if civil society spawns such "bad seeds," it is
appropriate for the state to try to "civilize" them, "through
14. Id. at 311.
15. ld.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 312.
1& Id. at 316.
19. Id. at 318.
20. Id. at 346.
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inculcation of such principles as freedom, equality, and toleration. '21
If civil society institutions are to be judged by their replication of
core commitments of the state, then they will often fail. It is as if
Chief Justice Burger's defense of the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder22
became the template for acceptance of nongovernmental associations.
Recall that the Amish parents were arguing for a constitutionally
based opt-out from mandatory schooling laws.23 Burger's opinion for
the Court awarding such an opt-out focused on how the Amish way of
life, although insulated, replicated just what any parent would want
for their children, and what we would want from our democracy. 24
Burger's opinion appears to rest the case for an opt-out on the
separating group's willingness to mimic in their insulation what we
otherwise cherish in our assimilated environment. To recognize a
constitutional right of exit only under such terms is not to recognize
much. The same could be said of McClain and Fleming's argument in
their paper here. The virtues of civil society institutions must be
understood apart from how well they replicate our core common
public commitments.
Elsewhere I have argued for the virtues of separatist, nomic
communities.25 It is not just that they offer a place of opposition to
the government and that they desire to foster conceptions of the good
that differ from those of the public realm. We must also recognize
that these nomic communities seek to remain apart from that realm,
without even serving as a source of opposition. Some communities
want to live by themselves, by their own mores, and simply be left
alone. Our constitutional order is capacious enough to permit this.
In fact, the multiple repositories of power understanding of our
constitutional culture-its anti-foundationalism and its radical
recognition of plural locations of power-insists on the virtues, not
just the necessary evil, of communities that wish to exit, either in
whole or in part.
IV. CHILDREN AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Although adults must be given the freedom to depart from the
public, civic order, the same argument cannot apply to adults' choices
21. ld. at 347-48.
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. See id. at 209-12.
24. See id. at 209-12, 240.
25. See generally Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note 3.
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for their children. There are two principal arguments for ceding
substantial power to parents to educate their children as they see fit.
The first is that part of liberty of adults includes the freedom to
choose how to educate their children, even if that involves education
in insular, nondiverse ways of thinking. The second is that the best
interests of children are served, generally, by granting virtually
nonregulable education power to parents. Steve Gilles has written a"parentalist manifesto," 26 which relies on a version of the second
argument. Here, I contend that ensuring a robust civil society while
simultaneously remaining true to our Constitution's core principle of
nonconcentrated power requires rejecting Gilles' position.
Gilles argues that "the deference we extend to parental
educational choices should approach (though not necessarily equal)
the deference we give to the self-regarding choices of adult
individuals. 2 7 An argument from "parental incentives asserts that
the state should defer to parents' educational decisions on the ground
that parents are more likely to pursue the child's best interest as they
define it than is the state to pursue the child's best interest as the state
defines it."' 8  Here, Gilles maintains that we "should allocate
comprehensive educational authority to whoever is most likely to act
in the child's best interest, ' 29 and that "parents seem naturally
inclined to love and care for their children. '" 30
An argument from "parental ideals rejects the claim that the
state has a paramount interest in controlling the education of its
future citizens, on the ground that individuals have an even more
fundamental interest in nurturing their children and in being nurtured
by their parents. ' 31 Here, Gilles makes the following arguments:
"[c]hildren belong to (and with) their parents,' 32 "[plarenting is
central to the flourishing of parents and children, ' 33 "nurturing
children is inseparable from shaping their values," 34 "majoritarian
control of the child's values is unjust," 35 "[m]ajoritarian interference
26. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
937 (1996).
27. Id. at 939.
2& Id. at 940.
29. Id. at 952-53.
30. Id. at 953.
31. Id. at 940.
32. Id. at 961.
33. Id. at 962.
34. Id. at 965.
35. Id. at 967.
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with parental transmission of values is likewise unjust, 3 6 and finally
"[m]ajoritarian interference with parental education is not in the
child's best interest. 3 7 Accordingly, because of both the argument
from parental incentives and the argument from parental ideals, the
state should displace parental education of children only if the
parents "unreasonably deprive children of the essential prerequisites
for adult life and liberal citizenship. '38
I agree with much of Gilles' argument. Our constitutional
culture does not support heavy top-down imposition of child-rearing
decisions. The commitment to divided power requires that families
exist as separate sources of normative authority. But we can retain
strong families and simultaneously ensure that children reap the
benefits of multiple repositories of power. The simple way to achieve
this is to insist that all children attend public schools. 9 This way
(which would involve overruling Pierce v. Society of Sisters)4° parents
would be able to influence directly an enormous proportion of a
child's time (all the time not in school) and teachers and children of
various walks of life would be able to influence another, smaller
proportion.
An immediate objection to this idea is that the state would
become a monopolist of formal education, and that does not seem to
gibe with the commitment to divided power. But the enormously
difficult problem regarding children's education is that the
alternative, allowing parents to control the formal education of their
children, risks losing some children to the monopoly of their parents.
Parents who would educate them in ways that never give children the
opportunity to learn to choose differently. At least in my suggested
system parents can still, through their love and nurturance (key
factors for Gilles), have heavy influence over how their children
develop.
Gilles rejects an argument of this sort. "[T]he state battling with
36. Id. at 968.
37. Id. at 970.
3& Id at 941.
39. Such a move would also allow us to devote our educational reform efforts at improving
public schools, even public school choice, rather than pushing toward the establishment of a
multitude of private schools, many of which will be homogenous. I make the argument here for
requiring public schooling, but I could make the same point in a somewhat weaker way by
allowing private schools with substantial state oversight to ensure that certain values be taught.
See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 32-33, 50, 118 (1987). Gilles rejects both
models.
40. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also Greene, Vouchers, supra note 3, at 406-08.
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minority parents to win the child's allegiance is both subversive of
parental nurturing and authority, and counter to the widely held and
reasonable judgment... that the child needs to receive a coherent
education shaped by some controlling conception of the good."'41
Gilles adds an argument that since we all want our children's
education to follow our notions of the good life, we would agree in
principle to a reduced role for the state. But that argument is highly
contentious and basically assumes away all of the key disputed
matters. It is the first argument that must carry the day here for
Gilles: that the "strongest educational influences in the child's life"
should not be placed "at cross purposes" and thereby "sow confusion
and discord rather than coherence and stability." 42 This is a critical
juncture of Gilles' paper, because one could agree with virtually
everything else he argues about parental authority over children, but
depart at this point by insisting on a critical state role to counteract a
potential parental monopoly. Gilles' argument that children are
somehow damaged by being exposed to a multitude of values, of
theories of the good, is completely speculative, and it is anchored in a
highly disputed conception of moral learning.
In the next section of the piece Gilles maintains that "most
parents agree that children need to be raised in some coherent,
comprehensive tradition that will ground their values and beliefs. '43
Either this is uncontroversially true (to the extent that it cedes a
substantial role to parents in rearing their children) or it speculatively
resolves the key question (on whether raising children to believe in
certain things is significantly damaged by insisting that children be
exposed to other norms as well).
I would suggest, contrary to Gilles, that strong, loving parents
can handle the conflicting values their children might pick up in
public schools. By showing both through word and deed a better way
to be, parents can strengthen those purportedly superior choices
through opposition to other modes, rather than simply teaching them
in a vacuum.
41. Gilles, supra note 26, at 969.
42 Id
43. ld. at 970.
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